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The Impact of Downsizing and Efficiency
Measures on Anti-Fraud Resources
Marek Palasinski
Lancaster University, Lancashire, United Kingdom
The main purpose of this study was to explore the impact of downsizing and
efficiency measures on two key elements of operational performance - fraud
detection and fraud reporting. Qualitative data were obtained from
ethnographic observations of two major multinational insurance companies,
which were already examined before the Global Financial Crisis, and
subjected to an inter- and intra-business comparative analysis of anti-fraud
resources. The paper points out a big discrepancy in opinions on the
downsizing effects between junior staff and their supervisors. Whereas the
latter present them as enabling the business to deal with suspicious claims
more quickly, the former offer a contrastingly different view in which the
constantly growing pressure often leads to suspicious claims getting
approved. By validating the practical implications of a purposefully adapted
version of resource-based theory, the paper illustrates the inviability of
subjecting anti-fraud resources to the same levels of downsizing and efficiency
as other business resources. Although the literature on the general negative
impact of downsizing on the broadly-defined operational performance is
growing, this is the first major study to examine its impact on insurance antifraud processes and illustrate their changes following the Global Financial
Crisis. Keywords: Efficiency Measures, Ethnography, Insurance Fraud
The Impact of Downsizing and Efficiency Measures on Anti-fraud Resources
While some research shows positive effects of workforce reduction on organizational
performance (Bowman & Singh, 1993; Demuse, Vanderheiden & Bergman, 1994), there are
also studies revealing its disruptive nature (Bethel & Liebeskind, 1993; Cascio, 1993;
Krishnan & Park, 2002). The “mean and lean” attempts to improve productivity through
downsizing, defined as an intentional reduction in personnel intended to improve the
efficiency or effectiveness of the firm (Freeman & Cameron, 1993), have been regarded as
the preferred route since the mid 1980’s (Laabs, 1990). They almost inevitably lead to layoff
survivors having to pick up at least some of their departed colleagues’ tasks (Lewin &
Johnston, 2000), which can lower their morale (Mishra, Mishra, & Spreitzer, 2009; Petzall,
Parker, & Stoeberl, 2000), increase anxiety (Brockner et al., 1986; Brockner, Grover, Reed,
& DeWitt, 1992), absenteeism (Cascio, 1993) and impair performance (Fisher & White,
2000; Krishnan & Park, 2002).
By equating downsizing with cutting cost through an across the board reduction of
headcount, many executives adopt an excessively short-sighted approach that seems to result
in star performers being given incentives to leave, depleting crucial skills in human resources
and creating the need for patch-up solutions that newly hired consultants are paid to find (De
Vries & Balazs, 1996). In this light, and given the quite well-established literature on
downsizing, the reader would be right to ask what new contribution is attempted to be made
in this study which examines restructuring in the motor insurance industry. Is there anything
new to say? I argue that whilst the general examination of downsizing effects is important, its
breadth might be in conducive to gleaning the subtle micro-level details that could come to
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light if individual aspects of operational performance, like fraud detection and fraud
reporting, were analyzed.
Quite a lot of research has already focused on the types of fraudsters (Clarke, 1989),
on their characteristics (Palasinski, 2009) and on how and why fraud is committed (Gill,
Woolley & Gill, 1994; Doig, Jones, & Wait, 1999). Dodd (1998) reports that the forms of
insurance fraud vary widely - from amateur and opportunistic claimants making false
statements through to organized networks engaging in sophisticated scams. According to the
Crime and Fraud Prevention Bureau (2000), the most typical forms are: reporting inflated
loss value (39%), misrepresenting circumstances (32%), making completely false claims
(12%), claiming from multiple insurers (3%), and using less conventional methods (14%).
Researchers have also studied the responses of the insurance industry to fraud. They
note that despite some similarities in how fraud is tackled, there are considerable differences
in the adopted tactics (Clarke, 1990), in the definition of fraud (Doig, Jones, & Wait, 1999)
and in fraud detection methods. The methods may include a voice stress analysis (Horvath,
1982), statistical analysis (Artis, Ayuso, & Guillen, 2002), anti-fraud software analysis
(Morley, Ball, & Ormerod, 2006), “suspicion-building” IT toolset (Ormerod, Ball, & Morley,
2012) and claims auditing strategies (Schiller, 2006; Tennyson & Salsas-Forn, 2002). Even
before the Global Financial Crisis, however, there was unanimous recognition of fraud as a
major problem (Dodd, 1998; Litton, 1990; Ormerod, Morley, Ball, Langley, & Spencer,
2003).
Thus, the complexity of insurance fraud can perhaps be only matched by its impact.
According to a report by the Association of British Insurers (2009), its annual cost in the UK
alone was estimated at just over £1 billion in 2001, £1.6 billion in 2007 and £1.9 billion in
2009. The same report also highlights that more and more people are being caught trying to
commit fraud by lying and withholding relevant information – a 30% increase on 2007.
These statistics indicate that insurance fraud has been growing faster than the implementation
of effective fraud detection and fraud reporting measures.
Such measures were identified as poor prior to the Crisis. In a major ethnographic
study of how the detection of insurance fraud succeeds and fails at two multinational
companies, Morley et al. (2006) report that the major obstacles to investigating suspicious
claims are organizational factors. More specifically, they note that frontline claims handlers,
who are primarily responsible for the detection of fraudulent claims, are usually
inexperienced (with the average company lifetime of less than two years), undertrained and
overloaded with productivity targets.
Morley et al. (2006) also describe the general business atmosphere at the two
companies to be infused with speedy rather than careful claims-processing, where any
individual sense ownership for claims is minimal, where feedback is limited and unreflective
work is encouraged. For example, they note that the frontline staff, who receive no incentive
for reporting their suspicions, are required to strictly stick to a telephone script and complete
a checklist of fraud indicators, some of which describe suspicious claimants as aggressive,
vague and hesitant. In a separate follow-up study, Palasinski (2009) shows that potential
claimants are actually more likely to describe fraudsters as polite, accurate and cooperative,
thus demonstrating the incorrectness of the image that the insurance industry still associates
with fraudsters. Have such organizational factors changed since then?
The losses suffered by the British and American financial institutions since the Crisis
have run at trillions of pounds, leading to banks going virtually bankrupt, being taken over by
the state or acquired by other institutions (Dewatripont, Rochet, & Tirole, 2010). Whereas
most of the insurance industry in the European model went through the Crisis with relatively
little difficulty, some of the more deregulated Anglo-Saxon industry had to be downsized,
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nationalized or have its assets put on sale, leading to closures, mass redundancies, pay freezes
and dramatic efficiency measures (Schich, 2009).
Given a serious deficit in research on how such major restructuring can affect
individual elements of operational performance, like anti-fraud resources, I analyze to what
extent the two companies have incorporated the six major recommendations suggested to
them in the pre-Crisis study by Morley et al. (2006). The recommendations include:
1. offering incentives for spotting and reporting anomalies,
2. offering increased and more regular training opportunities,
3. developing organizational processes that integrate fraud-detection methods
with claims-handling,
4. making modern anti-fraud software more available and
5. offering better training for the effective use of such software,
6. as well as increasing a degree of ownership of claims.
Tracing such changes, I respond to Birati and Tziner’s (2000) call for the exploration
of potential impact that major organizational changes, like downsizing and new efficiency
measures, can have on likely financial results of individual companies rather than on a more
general economic climate. Given that downsizing often forces management to identify where
they have the greatest competitive advantage and to revaluate their organizational structures
to maximize that advantage (Griggs & Hyland, 2003), I draw on resource-based theory
(Wernerfelt, 1984) that played a large role in shaping the direction and contents of my
ethnographic observations. The theory has already been proven as an effective tool for
assessing both the positive and negative effects of a major restructuring (Chatterjee &
Wernerfelt, 1991; Krishnan & Park, 2002). Even though Priem and Butler (2001) criticize the
theory for its alleged tautological character, conceptual vagueness and limited prescriptive
limitations, Crook, Ketchen, Combs, and Todd (2008) argue that its usefulness in the
identification, development, and distribution of value from strategic resources is high.
Although one of the main precepts of the theory is that a sustainable competitive
advantage stems from unique bundles of resources that competitors cannot imitate
(Wernerfelt, 1984), in this study I adopt a more moderate stance by Barney (1991, p. 117)
who interprets such resources as “neither perfectly imitable nor substitutable without great
effort.” For the purposes of this research, then, the anti-fraud resources are defined as all
assets, capabilities, organizational processes, and information helping the business to gain a
sustained competitive advantage – the claims handlers’ ability and opportunity to detect and
deal with insurance claims that they find suspicious, unusual and complex. I propose that the
advantage might be potentially achieved by approaching the anti-fraud resources differently
from other business resources and by not putting them under similar pressure of downsizing.
Whilst this approach may seem quite imitable, the successful identification, testing and
preservation of all such anti-fraud resources are complex and demanding. Furthermore, the
individual qualitative structure and contents of the resources, which even similar businesses
organize in their own specific ways, might still result in unique elements of a winning
competitive edge.
Method
I adopted an ethnographic approach, which has been proven to be an effective tool for
complementing statistical, interview and questionnaire methods (Hill, 2009). This approach
allows for up-close and personal insights through participant observation and, unlike survey
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and interview techniques, it has the capacity for illuminating complex social processes and
work activities in a live natural environment (Seale, Gobo, Gubrium, & Silverman, 2004).
The procedure lasted for 3 weeks during different working hours at various times and
involved a number of diverse and systematic activities, like observing and interacting with
junior staff and their supervisors at different departments of the two different multinational
insurance companies that were subject to a similar, albeit not restructuring-focused,
ethnographic analysis before the Crisis (Morley et al., 2006). To maximize the possibility of
drawing comparisons with that analysis, I focused only on the 20 junior staff and 6
supervisors who admitted to having the experience of the pre-Crisis processes and
procedures.
I assured them all of anonymity and confidentially, and encouraged them to express
themselves as openly as possible. I advised them that their opinions would not be shared with
any staff members and that they were simply meant to enrich my study, which was
introduced to them as exploration of business restructuring and anti-fraud practices. Sitting
separately with both claims handlers and supervisors, I attended team and managerial
meetings, each time carefully observing them, occasionally asking questions about the given
activity and always trying to listen to what was going on around me.
During the observations at the two companies, I took regular field notes and samples
of documents describing a variety of work procedures that could fall into the category of antifraud resources. I have not, however, obtained the permission to make audio recordings so,
unable to take classical think-aloud protocols, I made bullet-point notes of what participants
said they were doing. All the data could then be subjected to inter- and intra-business
comparative analyses of the anti-fraud resources, giving insight into the differences between
the two companies and the individual changes they have made since the Crisis (see Tables 1
and 2 in the Appendix).
Results
The perspectives of junior staff
When asked about the changes introduced to their workplace in the last three years,
the claims handlers at the two companies were highly critical of them. They complained
about constantly increasing workload, closer monitoring and the approach of “a stick” rather
than “a carrot”. Thus, they said that more and more performance incentives were being
phased out and in their place new key performance indicators were being brought in. As a
result, at Company A meeting certain objectives, which used to be rewarded with vouchers
and bonuses for referring customers to the affiliated repair garages for example, were now
considered part and parcel of the job and required as standard performance. At both
companies, new and more complex telephone systems replaced the old ones so that now
almost all work activities could be measured more accurately than before. The handlers
mentioned that there used to be just a few codes for them to enter to indicate the reason for
logging off the phone. Now they complained about too many codes and being under much
closer surveillance than before, which most of them commented upon as relegating the matter
of identifying and reporting suspicious claims to the bottom of their work priorities.
Whereas at both companies there used to be large white boards listing the teams’
overall performance, now at Company A the boards listed individual performance, while at
Company B there were now separate boards for performers and underperformers whose
names were written down in red for everybody in the office to see. At company B consistent
underperformance, which was defined as continual failure to process a target number of
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claims over a month, was followed by an action plan and suggested solutions, like having to
make up for missed targets by working overtime.
Company A used to put the primary emphasis on the quality of customer service
experience so that the handlers had more time for claims-processing and inspection of
suspicious cases. Now it was the quantity of processed claims that was most important and
even the staff that used to work exclusively as quality controllers were tasked with claimstaking. Whereas at both companies the quality feedback used to be very regular, it was now
sporadic and focused on errors rather than on praise. Consequently, just like during the first
ethnographic study a few years ago (Morley et al., 2006), at both companies the claims
handlers received almost no information on the suspicious leads that they could identify from
a list of fraud indicators that were now simpler and shorter than before. Used as a heuristic, a
fraud indicator describes a factor assumed to be indicative of potential fraud. While
commercial confidentiality does not allow for publishing all such indicators, some of them
have been shown to actually facilitate fraud (Palasinski, 2009). It is thus apparent that their
simplified and nuance-lacking versions, which are meant to help the downsized fraud
departments with quicker approval or repudiation of claims, almost inevitably let the more
complex and suspicious cases “slip through the net.”
At both companies, team meetings and “huddles,” during which new procedures,
objectives and general feedback were announced, were now much less regular and team
communication was by and large reduced to impersonal emails and paper brochures. At
neither company could the handlers recall any formal training since the Crisis began. They
were also unanimous about having to combine different roles that used to be exclusively
allocated to different employees. Thus at Company A, the motor insurance staff were now
asked to deal with the notification of household claims. Although they were sent email
instructions of how to fill in the household claim form and they could count on the assistance
of the team leader, who also took claims when the work volume was high, they received no
separate list of household fraud indicators and no household fraud training.
At Company B, the claims handlers now had to deal with additional administrative
tasks that used to be given to the back offices that were recently closed and partially
offshored. They were also given the responsibility for investigating suspicious claims that
used to be allocated to the now non-existent fraud team. Such new responsibility involved
checking new claims for very broadly defined “anomalies” and fraud indicators, contacting
claimants, brokers, repair garages, GPs and the police about any information that might
clarify the circumstances surrounding a claim. For example, if a described accident appeared
to be minor and all four passengers tried to claim for whiplash injury or if the claimant
insisted on using his own repairer garage and his repair quote seemed to be too high, then the
handlers were required to stop dealing with new claims and focus on the suspicious one.
Notwithstanding such new workload, it was not rewarded as, like before the Crisis,
there were no incentives for identifying and reporting cases that were eventually classed as
fraudulent. On the contrary, the time spent on investigating such cases worked against the
handlers and affected their productivity figures that were directly related to their performance
assessment. At Company A, the fraud department remained a separate organizational unit,
but its members were required not to spend more than the average of 30 minutes on
suspicious cases, “unless dealing with unusual and complex circumstances.” When the work
volume was high, they were now also asked to work as normal claims handlers, which they
reported to take them approximately 25% of their time. Consequently, both the claims
handling and fraud staff were observed to take a number of shortcuts to comply with the new
company procedures and to avoid missing their new productivity targets. For example, rather
than contacting all the available witnesses, they would contact only one or focus on only
those whose statements expedited claims-processing. They would also focus on only selective
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leads and on sources fitting the version of events that were conducive to setting the claim
quickly, referring only the most complex cases, like those involving very serious injury or
unusually high cost, to loss adjusters and fraud managers.
At both companies, it was evident that the skills of the staff were grossly
underutilized. For example, at Company A one quarter of the experienced claims handlers
(comprising around 35% of the junior staff who were employed for more than 3 years) were
degree holders, but they admitted not to have received any special training or development
track that would tap into their skills. In contrast, there were some of such opportunities at
Company B, where one fifth of the experienced staff (comprising around 30% of the junior
staff who were employed for more than 3 years) were degree holders. However, most of the
opportunities were limited to coordinating a small team and were repeatedly described as not
much more financially attractive to make up for the additional administrative responsibilities
and greater job uncertainty.
At both companies, most of the staff indirectly complained about an increasingly
demoralizing atmosphere of depersonalization, boredom and sterile “brain-cell” killing
environment, where critical thinking was discouraged and “robot-like” behavior was
rewarded. One can easily notice that their knowledge of the bottom-up processes combined
with the analytical skills that some of them could hone during their studies might provide
new insights into organizational anti-fraud processes that their supervisors were isolated
from. Despite some opportunities to share such knowledge at both companies, for example in
the form of a suggestion box or solutions board, there was no system in place that would
financially reward good ideas.
Most of the staff I interacted with also admitted that the employee satisfaction surveys
that they were required to complete on the computer could be easily traced back to them and
hence they could not be really as anonymous as they were presented by the supervisors. On a
positive note, compared with the working environment before the Crisis, it was clear that
certain organizational processes conducive to tackling fraud improved a little. At both
companies, new claims that used to be dealt with by different staff at different stages were
now allocated to particular individuals, facilitating communication and creating a much
greater sense of ownership. There was also greater access to new and automatically updated
software, enabling a much quicker and more flexible look into the history of a given
claimant, car or address than it was the case before, yet the training in its usage was reported
by the junior staff as minimal.
The perspectives of team leaders and supervisors
When asked about the new changes in the last three years, the team leaders and
supervisors at Company A and Company B were respectively quite positive and very positive
about them. They spoke of the greater workload in terms of developing the staff, improving
the organizational health of the business and increasing its competitiveness on the market. At
Company A, they presented the tasking of the motor claims handlers with the notification of
household claims as not only adding variety to the job, but also increasing their employability
and promotional prospects in general. Lacking any formal training and qualifications in
household claims, the supervisors stated that household fraudsters would operate very
similarly to motor fraudsters, emphasizing that the best strategy of tackling fraud was using
“common sense” and sticking to the same fraud indicators that were already used in motor
insurance. They said that they did not see the need to rephrase some of the indicators in
household terminology to facilitate their better use as “the slight differences in wording were
obvious.”
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At Company A, where the fraud department remained a separate organizational unit,
they were in agreement that giving the fraud staff the average of 30 minutes on suspicious
cases was sufficient. They also presented the tasking of the fraud staff with claims-taking as
only occasional and unlikely to take them more than 10% of their time, although the fraud
staff described it as regular and consuming approximately 25% of their time. Along similar
lines, at Company B asking the claims handlers to deal with additional administrative tasks
and adopt the role of fraud investigators was presented as tapping into the handlers’ insider’s
knowledge, which, I was told, would be of greater relevance than relying on the ex-fraud
team members who were isolated from direct customer contact. At neither company was the
issue of taking shortcuts and conflict with productivity targets mentioned spontaneously, but
when I raised it at Company A I was advised that it was one of the main reasons why they
kept the claims and fraud departments as separate organizational units. At Company B, I was
told that the closer monitoring would not allow for “cutting corners” and hence there was
little conflict between investigating fraud and hitting productivity targets as the staff would
simply have to follow their basic guidelines.
Most of the supervisors at both companies presented the closer monitoring as enabling
the business to provide insurance policy holders with better quality customer service that
could be excellent each and every time. They also commented on the performance boards as
being now more detailed and personalized, helping them quickly identify who needed extra
support and training. The supervisors acknowledged that some of the more experienced
claims handlers could now find the greater surveillance uncomfortable, but they also argued
that it was simply a matter of getting used to it, and that it was not a problem for new
employees who did not work under the “old” system before the Crisis.
Thus, as the supervisors at Company A put it, “pampering the staff with perks simply
for doing their job” was no longer justified. At Company B, they argued that giving certain
incentives, like those for correctly identifying fraudulent cases could distract the claims
handlers from doing their job – indemnifying policy holders. At both companies, the
supervisors described their shorter list of simplified fraud indicators as more efficient and
effective. They admitted that there was already an established approach of accepting the costs
of declines in fraud detection as a trade off for a much more efficient throughput, but denied
putting such an approach in imbalance, although the new trade off remained uncalculated.
At Company A, the team leaders and supervisors argued that both quantity and quality
were equally important, but given the new set of control measures and closer monitoring, the
claims handlers “had now a better opportunity to focus on their productivity” and “work their
way up through their motivation and efforts rather than tricks.” They also presented the
tasking of quality controllers with normal claims-processing as a way of way of diversifying
their workload and keeping them up to date with bottom-up processes. At both companies,
they explained that error avoidance and increased productivity should be top priorities for the
handlers, stating that hitting the set targets would also be recognized during the annual staff
appraisal.
At both companies, they described the communication through emails and paper
brochures as fast, easy and clear; emphasizing that formal meeting would still be organized if
bigger changes in procedures were to be implemented. Additional training for the
experienced staff was labeled as “superfluous” or “impractical” as it was stated that the best
training, including the anti-fraud training, was the actual practice. Whereas at Company A
new starters would be sat among the more experienced staff, which appears to be conducive
to fostering an effective learning environment, at Company B they would be clustered
together and encouraged to learn from one another with the support of an experienced team
leader. The latter approach seems to allow for the sharing and consolidation of errors that
might be left unchecked by the busy team leader who was not always available.
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With regards to the staff development, the supervisors at both companies emphasized
that it was their priority to recruit and retain only the best people, but they denied that
graduates would necessarily be any better than school leavers. At Company A, promotional
opportunities were presented as “open to anybody with the right skills and attitude,” whereas
at Company B they were presented as most available for the internal staff with experience
rather than “pretentious and arrogant graduates with no real business knowledge.” At
Company A, it was explained to me, every year a few junior staff with top performance
scores could qualify for management training, but it was clear that correctly identifying
fraudulent claims would not be measured and would not be reflected in the scores. As a
result, highly productive individuals with little proven anti-fraud effectiveness or anti-fraud
training could end up advising and managing fraud teams. At Company B, I was told, there
was no formal promotional track for the staff to join, but everybody was personally
responsible for their development and that “people with the right ideas would be
automatically referred further.” Nonetheless, I could not get a clearer definition of such a
referral or what it would involve.
The supervisors at both companies stated that the changes introduced to the business
in the last three years had a very stimulating impact on all the staff, diversifying their roles
and developing their skills. At Company A, they stated that the sheer number of the stillongoing changes would keep their business a dynamic place for many months to come, while
at Company B they argued that many of their staff, who had been indirectly complaining
of monotony and boredom before, were now tasked with additional duties to satisfy their
need for extra stimulation. No clear steps, however, were taken to match the additional duties
to the claimants' skills or to assess their impact on fraud detection practices.
At both companies, the supervisors argued that the simplified procedures and
guidelines must have had a general positive impact on the work quality “as the staff were
now relieved from having to overanalyze a number of common scenarios.” They explained
that they were open to suggestions and solutions recommended by the claims and fraud staff,
and that although it would be impractical to reward all of them individually, they might play
a role in promotion and their creators would be recognized during the annual performance
appraisal. The mangers also presented themselves as open to criticism and assured me that
despite the computerized forms, all employee satisfaction surveys were anonymous and
individually untraceable.
Despite heavier workload, new targets and downsizing, at both companies they
described the general organizational processes as modernized and streamlined. The improved
access to the latest commercially available anti-fraud software was said to offset the
possibility that the junior staff, who were tasked with extra duties, might fail to spot
fraudulent claims. It was also clear that more resources were invested in fraud screening
technology than in training the staff to spot and investigate their suspicious. Such an
approach appears to be in conducive to limiting financial leakage as it was already observed
in the earlier pre-Crisis ethnographic research that it is the front-line staff who are best
positioned to spot and investigate anomalies (Morley et al., 2006).
At both companies, the supervisors spoke with confidence about the ability of their
staff to use and interpret the data from the anti-fraud software, although every claims
handler I had interacted with advised me that they could not fully operate it or that they could
only use its basic functions. At Company A, the supervisors told me that there were plans for
training their staff to better use such software, but they would not specify their nature or
timescale. At Company B, they said that the new anti-fraud technology would allow them to
keep only a few very well-trained claims handlers on whose expertise the majority of the
future less experienced staff could rely.
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Discussion
Following Van Rooy et al.’s (2011) strong recommendation for measuring workforce
attitudes, especially during an economic downturn, this study gives insight into contrastingly
different stances on the impact that a major downsizing seems to have on anti-fraud
resources. Thus, the team leaders and supervisors, most of whom were isolated from bottomup business processes, did not appear to be fully aware of the effects of the new changes. At
both companies, they held a number of unjustified assumptions about tackling fraud, like
stating that household insurance fraudsters would operate similarly to car insurance fraudsters
and over-relying on anti-fraud software rather than on training their staff. They also seemed
oblivious to the fact that the closer monitoring, higher productivity targets and no feedback
on even successfully identified fraudulent claims had an apparently demoralizing impact on
the staff, some of whom openly admitted that following their suspicions adversely affected
their performance figures and was not really an aspect of their responsibility.
It appears most of the recommendations by Morley et al. (2006) have been ignored
and many of their opposites have been accepted. The two companies have failed to offer
incentives for reporting anomalies, adding new disincentives, making training opportunities
even less regular and increasing communication via impersonal emails. It seems that tasking
junior staff with many extra duties has also hampered the integration of fraud-detection
methods with claims handling. Although better anti-fraud software was now more available,
at both companies the experienced junior staff admitted to not knowing how to fully use its
potential. On a positive note, however, it must be mentioned that both companies increased a
degree of ownership of claims.
It is apparent that most of the analysed efficiency measures, including increased
pressure and limited feedback, may not just fail to facilitate the detection and reporting of
insurance fraud, but are actually likely to have an adverse effect, which probably impairs very
important aspects of operational performance. What the supervisors described as
“multitasking,” “faster communication,” and “closer monitoring,” the junior staff often
referred to as respectively “growing pressure,” “impersonal emails,” and “intrusive
surveillance.” Such juxtapositions between the respective mitigation (Van Dijk, 1992) and
extreme case formulations (Pomerantz, 1986) offer a glimpse into two contrasting discursive
worlds. Whether or not such a contrast is apocryphal is less significant than the effect it
appears to have on relegating the matter of investigating suspicious claims to a place of
secondary importance.
The junior staff, however, did not seem to be completely cynical about all the
organizational changes, although they showed quite a high degree of change-specific
scepticism. Using Stanley, Meyer, and Topolnytsky’s (2005) distinction between scepticism
and cynicism, which they also find to be closely correlated and potentially causal, it appears
that the junior staff were more doubtful about the viability of the changes than about the
ulterior motives for implementing them. Could, then, they be closer to the “reality” of the
situation than their team leaders and supervisors?
Notwithstanding the considerable differences in their perspectives on that “reality,”
one must bear in mind that they could be equally valid on the grounds of different value
systems and metrics. In other words, given the salience of heavier workload, more intensive
performance monitoring, fewer rewards for good performance, removal of team performance
metrics, lack of formal training opportunities and reduced focus on customer service, the
evaluation of the restructuring by the junior staff was almost unanimously pejorative. In
contrast, by emphasizing improved organisational health, increased market competitiveness,
greater job variety and capitalising on insider knowledge, the team leaders and supervisors
had sound reasons to view the organizational changes in positive terms.
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In this light, it might be inaccurate to claim that the junior staff were simply right and
“in the loop” and their supervisors were wrong and “out of touch.” The situation might be
more complex and heavily dependent on what financial impact rejecting suspicious claims
has had in comparison with the pre-downsizing time. Until such data is available (at the time
of finishing this manuscript it is not) and is subjected to detailed statistical analyses, which is
compounded by the subjectivity and ambiguity of what constitutes suspicious claims (e.g.,
there were no guidelines on whether non-verbal clues were more important than the logical
ones) it is premature to claim that downsizing and efficiency measures must have an
inevitably negative impact on anti-fraud resources.
All this study shows, then, is that it is likely to be the case, which lends support to a
separate exploration that would take into account the full financial balance sheets. However,
extrapolating from the comprehensive model treating downsizing programs the same as any
other projected investment by a firm (Birati & Tziner, 2000), the very (surprising) absence of
even restructuring-adjusted estimates of fraud-linked leakage can be quite fairly interpreted in
terms of insufficient control, high risk and presumptuousness, suggesting that the general
effect of the (clearly under-planned) downsizing on anti-fraud resources is probably indeed
negative. That said, what I hope to have achieved is to demonstrate that examining individual
aspects of operational performance, like fraud detection and fraud reporting, through the lens
of resource-based theory can represent an insightful and practical approach shedding unique
qualitative light that would be obscured if a traditionally general analysis of downsizing was
used. Highlighting the implications from a contextualised resource-based theory, I conclude
that the anti-fraud resources apparently should not be subject to the same levels of untested
downsizing and efficiency as other business resources. To do otherwise, is to risk too many
fraudulent claims to “slip through the net,” unless it turns out that the costs of declines in
fraud detection will be a beneficial trade off for a much more efficient throughput, which the
senior staff expected, but could not estimate or calculate yet.
Naturally, a few words of caution are due. Even though the junior staff at both
companies were almost uniformly critical of the significant changes in their job tasks and
routines, it is likely that the newly hired staff, whose perspectives were not analyzed due to
the inexperience of the pre-Crisis processes and procedures, could be more positive about the
changes. Could they then perform better than the “older” staff? Given the greatly increased
complexity of the procedural tasks, as well as the longer and expensive process of training, it
would be logical to suspect that at least in the short-run they most likely could not. The
question about their long-term performance is complicated by the high call-center staff
turnover (Morley et al., 2006), individual differences (Koberg, Chesley, & Heppard, 2000)
and how managers respond to the anxiety (Richardson & Denton, 1996), decreased morale
(Mishra et al., 2009) and frustration (Luthans & Sommer, 1999) of their workers.
It must also be mentioned that despite the efforts to try to minimize subjectivity, the
analysis and conclusions were probably shaped by my individual preconceptions, knowledge
and expectations - the elements which Seale et al. (2004) present as an inevitable and natural
part of qualitative research. Although alternative definitions and theoretical frameworks
could have been used in this exploration (Datta, Guthrie, Basuil, & Pandey, 2010), I
hypothesize that they would lead to quite similar conclusions, which also paves the way for
confirmatory research. Despite Hammersley’s (1990) criticism of the ethnographic method
on the grounds of relatively limited validity and reliability, Borland (2001) argues that the
issue of balancing subjectivity and objectivity, representativeness and selective sampling, as
well as generalizability and uniqueness has been relevant to social sciences in general.
LeCompte and Preissle (1982) even criticize such dichotomous divisions themselves. Given
the parallels between the two companies, the described processes and their implications are
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likely to be relevant to a wider sector of the downsized and more and more efficiency-driven
insurance industry, which should be explored in other research.
Such research might take into account other factors, like layoff survivors’ work ethic,
role ambiguity and job involvement (Brockner, Grover, & Blonder, 1988), as well as selfesteem (Brockner, Grover, O’Malley, Reed, & Glynn, 1993; Wiesenfeld, Brockner, &
Thibault, 2000), organizational commitment and perceived control (Brockner et al., 2004).
Exploring the post-Crisis effects of such a major restructuring would also provide us with a
fuller longitudinal perspective, which is both a timely and important matter. It appears,
however, that insurance managers do not tend implement recommendations from academics,
leaving room for future research that might focus on how to enhance cooperation between
them. Why it is the case is naturally speculative, but it seems that continuous doubts about
academia (Pfeffer & Fong, 2002) and its perception as ivory tower detached from “business
reality” (Hershberg, Nabeshima, & Yusuf, 2007) are worth taking into consideration, the
message arguably being that there is still scope for narrowing the gap between them.
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Appendix
Table 1
Perspectives on Major Post-downsizing Changes in the Two Companies by the Junior Staff
Similarities
changes generally criticized
emails and paper brochures described as obstructing communication
the importance of fraud identification and reporting minimized
complaints about constantly increasing workload and closer monitoring
complaints about depersonalization, boredom and routines
performance incentives phased out
new key performance indicators brought in
new and more complex telephone systems replacing the old ones
less regular and error-focused feedback
less regular and shorter team meetings
increased multitasking without sufficient training
no system in place that would financially reward good ideas
new claims now allocated fully to particular individuals
greater access to new and automatically updated anti-fraud software

Differences
no special training or development track for employed graduates at Company A
boards listing individual performance at Company A
less emphasis on customer service at Company A
quality controllers and fraud staff tasked with claims-taking at Company A
junior staff tasked with household claims at Company A
junior staff tasked with new administrative tasks at Company B
junior staff tasked with investigating suspicious claims at Company B
separate boards for performers and underperformers at Company B
increased need for making up for missed targets at Company B
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Table 2
Perspectives on Major Post-downsizing Changes in the Two Companies by the Team Leaders
and Supervisors
Similarities
changes generally approved
changes described as skill-developing and efficiency-improving
emails and paper brochures described as facilitating communication
error avoidance and increased productivity described as top priorities
increased workload described in terms of improving the staff and business
closer monitoring described as facilitating better quality customer service
additional training for the experienced staff described as unnecessary
performance boards described as early problem-spotting systems
anti-fraud software described as offsetting reduced time for suspicious claims
shorter lists of simplified fraud indicators described as more effective
declines in fraud detection assumed to be a trade off for greater efficiency
taking shortcuts and conflict with productivity not mentioned spontaneously
recruitment and retention of only the best people emphasized
the impact of additional duties on fraud detection remaining unassessed

Differences
household fraudsters assumed to operate like motor fraudsters at Company A
tasking fraud staff with claims-taking described as only occasional at Company A
rewarding staff for good performance described as unjustified at Company A
new starters placed among the more experienced staff at Company A
plans for training the junior staff to better use anti-fraud software at Company A
mostly external and formal promotional opportunities at Company A
mostly internal and informal promotional opportunities at Company B
tasking junior staff with admin tasks described as smart at Company B
closer monitoring described as minimizing multitasking conflict at Company B
rewarding staff performance described as distracting at Company B
new starters clustered together at Company B
plans for using anti-fraud software to minimize training of new staff at Company B
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